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Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery 
Slope of the Clickwrap Conundrum 
MICHELLE GARCIA 
ABSTRACT 
Large changes to online contracts have been underway since 
Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap licensing became hallmarks of digital 
licensing.  Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap have changed how consumers 
enter into contracts by streamlining traditional notions of offer and 
acceptance.  The deficiencies of Clickwrap and Shrinkwrap licenses are 
well documented, yet their validity is nearly universally upheld in 
courts.  Another revolution in online contracts is taking place and no 
one is noticing.  Today, a majority of Internet users enter into binding 
contracts online by merely browsing webpages.  Browsewrap now stands 
poised to build upon the legal success of online licensing and become as 
accepted as Clickwrap in American courts.  Several solutions to the 
abuses of End-User License Agreements (EULAs) such as Shrinkwrap 
and Clickwrap contracts have been proposed through model state 
regulation and the common law.  However, these solutions cannot 
defend against the encroachment of Browsewrap.  This Article argues 
that an unlikely solution is possible through the use of federal regulation 
in the form of copyright law. 
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 32 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAJOR PLAYERS: SHRINKWRAP, CLICKWRAP 
AND BROWSEWRAP .......................................................................... 34 
II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP: PRESUMED ASSENT VIA  SHRINKWRAP AND 
CLICKWRAP ..................................................................................... 37 
A.  Shrinkwrap Software Licensing: Early Victory ........................ 37 
III.THE CLICKWRAP CONUNDRUM AND THE DEFEAT OF COMMON LAW 
CONTRACT FORMATION DEFENSES .................................................. 39 
IV. A SURVEY OF BROWSEWRAP CASE LAW AND  THE LIMITATIONS OF 
JUDICIAL RELIEF .............................................................................. 43 
A. Initial Browsewrap Cases: Hybrid Digital Contracts .............. 43 
1
Garcia: Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickw
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013
2. GARCIA_FINAL 1/17/2014  5:36 PM 
32 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:31 
B. Notice via User Action ............................................................ 46 
C. Off-Site Notice ........................................................................ 49 
D. Spiders and Robots: Notice by Automated Computer 
Program ................................................................................... 52 
E. Some Conclusions................................................................... 54 
V.PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE EULA CONTROVERSY: A SERIES OF 
LEGISLATIVE DEAD ENDS ................................................................. 56 
VI.CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT:  FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
LICENSING AGREEMENTS ................................................................. 61 
A. Copyright and Contract Law: A History of Tensions in 
the Digital Realm .................................................................... 61 
B. The Role of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 
Policing Internet Law .............................................................. 63 
VII.WHY THE DMCA IS THE BEST HOPE FOR REMEDYING  DIGITAL 
LACK OF NOTICE ............................................................................. 70 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 73 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine entering into a contract where you have no knowledge of 
the terms, no way to decline acceptance, and no knowledge you have 
entered into an agreement.  This is not some dystopian legal fantasy; it is 
the world of Browsewrap.  If you visit any major website today, chances 
are you have entered into some kind of Browsewrap agreement with 
perhaps a forum selection clause or mandatory arbitration clause, as are 
commonly written into End-User License Agreements (EULAs).  The act 
of simply going online has become fraught with unintended legal 
consequences due to the ubiquity of these one-sided contracts. 
Since the late 1990s, contract scholars have decried the use of 
Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap licensing as an erosion of contract rights and 
a perversion of adhesionary contracts.1  A voluminous amount of 
scholarly writing has been dedicated to studying the legality of EULAs in 
the digital realm.2  A pressing point of discussion among legal writers 
 
 1. See Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap 
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999).  
 2. The sheer volume of legal writing on the subject of EULAs, Clickwrap in 
particular, would be impossible to adequately present here.  For a more lengthy 
discussion of EULAs and their legality, see generally ROSS A. DANNENBERG ET AL., A.B.A. 
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, COMPUTER GAMES AND VIRTUAL WORLDS: A NEW 
FRONTIER IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1st ed. 2010); GENE K. LANDY & AMY. J. 
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who study such contracts is the widespread use of digital form 
contracts.3  As Paula Samuelson warned in her cautionary 1999 article to 
the Journal of Electronic Publishing: 
Given the ubiquity of shrinkwrap licenses in the mass-market for 
software and given the intent of licensors to bind the entire market, the 
commercial effect of enforcing those [EULAs] would make them 
resemble property rights (that is, rights good against the world) more 
than contract rights (good only against the two parties to the contract).  
It is, moreover, a legal fiction to say that opening a package or installing 
software constitutes an agreement to the terms of a shrinkwrap license.4 
The erosion of classic contracting ability between parties decried by 
Samuelson has undoubtedly come to pass in the form of widely accepted 
Browsewrap and Clickwrap agreements that now saturate the digital 
markets at levels few expected in the 1990s.  The contracting climate 
created by digital EULAs and online licensing acceptance is troubling 
because it erodes basic consumer rights in relation to contracts.  Indeed, 
the rise of Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and now Browsewrap threaten to 
overwhelm traditional standards for contracting between unequal 
bargainers such as large digital companies and their consumers.  
This Article explores the current landscape of EULAs in the digital 
realm, tracing the recent controversies of Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap 
licensing, and proposes a new avenue of regulation via federal copyright 
law.  It describes the defeat of common law contract formation defenses 
in Clickwrap cases that attacked the basic premise of the digital 
contracts’ creation on offer and acceptance grounds, as well as the 
attempts to prevent enforcement through showings of unconscionability.  
This Article shows how the excesses of EULAs in Shrinkwrap and 
Clickwrap have been magnified tenfold through the rise of Browsewrap 
in the few cases that have examined the issue.  Next, this Article surveys 
 
MASTROBATTISTA, THE IT/DIGITAL LEGAL COMPANION: A COMPREHENSIVE BUSINESS GUIDE TO 
SOFTWARE, IT, INTERNET, MEDIA, AND IP LAW (Elsevier, Inc. 2008); NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, (Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir, eds., 2003); 
Jamie J. Kayser, The New New-World: Virtual Property and the End User License 
Agreement, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 59 (2006). 
 3. See Anita G. Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible Treatment of Stored 
Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New Payment Mechanisms 57 BUS. LAW. 475 (2001).  
See also Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A 
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS. Paper 
29 (2005). 
 4. Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Does Information Really Want to Be 
Licensed?, 4 J. Elec. Pub. 3, (1999), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jep; 
view=text;rgn=main;idno=3336451.0004.305 (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
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the proposed improvements aimed at remedying the legal storm that 
erupted over EULAs and Clickwrap.  It examines the inconsistent 
judicial decisions on digital EULAs and the defeat of legislative solutions 
aimed at reining in digital EULAs, all of which have decimated legal 
protection for consumers.  The second half of this Article suggests a new 
route forward in protecting users from the extremes of online licensing 
through federal copyright regulation.  It traces the history of interactions 
between copyright and contract law with an emphasis on digital 
contracts.  It shows how copyright law has already made inroads into 
areas of traditional EULA control, and it examines the unique 
opportunity presented by the rise of Browsewrap to reopen discussion 
on the roles of uniform EULA regulation.  Finally, this Article posits that 
the unlikely vehicle of copyright law “determinations” made by the 
Librarian of Congress may be the best hope to counteract the excesses of 
EULAs and remedy the lack of meaningful notice in online contract 
formation. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAJOR PLAYERS: SHRINKWRAP, CLICKWRAP 
AND BROWSEWRAP 
Long before Internet use became commonplace, the software 
industry sparked major controversy in the 1990s by issuing EULAs in 
the form of Shrinkwrap licenses.  A Shrinkwrap license refers to the 
contract paperwork that software manufacturers shipped.  The software 
would usually arrive packaged in plastic film (Shrinkwrap) with a sticker 
across the front or a user manual listing the conditions for use of the 
software.  The Terms and Conditions would usually contain wording 
similar to the now infamous licensing language below from ProCD’s 
national directory CD listings as they shipped in 1996, which later 
sparked a lawsuit over the legality of the licensing agreement: 
Please read this license carefully before using the software or accessing 
the listings contained on the discs.  By using the discs and the listings 
licensed to you, you agree to be bound by the terms of this License.  If 
you do not agree to the terms of this License, promptly return all copies 
of the software, listings that may have been exported, the discs and the 
User Guide to the place where you obtained it.5 
The long form of the licensing agreement would usually be inside the 
plastic film and would contain all of the Terms and Conditions as in any 
other contract, with the caveat that by the time a user had been given the 
opportunity to review the contract, the user would have already 
 
 5. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
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effectively assented to the creation of the agreement by opening the 
Shrinkwrap.  In some instances, though not all, the license would 
include a window of time, such as ten days, during which a user could 
return the software and decline the licensing agreement. 
With the rise of the Internet, a new type of EULA emerged called 
Clickwrap.  Clickwrap is also known as web wrap, click proceed, and 
click through licensing.6  A Clickwrap license would appear to a 
software user as a single screen or a series of screens where the user 
would need to click an on-screen button stating that he or she read the 
Terms and Conditions of the software use and assented to the licensing 
agreement.7  Just as with Shrinkwrap licenses, legal scholars were 
outraged because “[t]he superior bargaining power of the software 
developer places the consumer in a ‘take it or leave it’ dilemma and many 
of her statutory entrenched rights may be curtailed by this agreement 
forced upon her.”8 
The newest iteration of online contracting inspired by Shrinkwrap 
is Browsewrap.  The term Browsewrap can refer to merely browsing a 
website, using a website, or to making a specific transaction which 
originated on the website.9  For example, a user who visits Bing.com to 
search for a website will have entered into a EULA with Terms and 
Conditions included, such as mandatory arbitration.10  As early as 2002, 
Clickwrap and Browsewrap agreements had become so common that 
researchers who surveyed website contracting practices described them 
as “industry standard.”11  Many Browsewrap contracts center on a “Terms 
of Service Agreement” whereby a user visits a website and by viewing the 
 
 6. Though in some early cases, courts considered instances where a user would 
actually need to type, “AGREE” at multiple times during the online contracting process.  
See Dawn Davidson, Click and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound to When They Enter 
Websites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1182 n.69 (2000). 
 7. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260–61 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 8. Tana Pistorius, Shrink-wrap and Click-Wrap Agreements: Can they be Enforced?, 7 
JUTA’S BUS. L. 79, 86 (1999). 
 9. See Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and 
Browsewrap Agreements and the ‘Reasonably Communicated’ Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 
498–99 (2002). 
 10. MICROSOFT SERVICES AGREEMENT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows-
live/microsoft-services-agreement (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
 11. Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons 
Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 N.W. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 42 (2009). 
5
Garcia: Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickw
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013
2. GARCIA_FINAL 1/17/2014  5:36 PM 
36 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:31 
website, using the website or even just navigating to the website, the 
user agrees to be bound by the Terms of Service located elsewhere.12  
In Browsewrap agreements, it is difficult to identify a moment or 
action analogous to the infamous clicking of “I Accept” seen in 
Clickwrap agreements.  Another important difference between 
Browsewrap and Clickwrap or Shrinkwrap agreements is that 
Browsewrap agreements generally are not used to license software.  
Instead, Browsewrap agreements are almost universally used to govern 
the “Terms of Service” or “Conditions of Use” for using a particular 
website.13  For example, the American Airlines website (AA.com) 
contains on its main page a very small blue link labeled “Legal,” which 
redirects users to another page titled “Legal Information” with more 
links.14  One of those links, “AA.com Site Usage,” directs users to a third 
page which contains the Terms of Service regarding use of the entire 
website.15  Thus, by navigating through the first three pages to reach the 
contract language, a user will have already assented to the AA.com 
contract.  
 
 
 12. Sometimes the Terms of Service location will be listed on the main page of the 
website or a link will be provided where users can click to navigate to the listed Terms of 
Service.  For example, by navigating to “Google.com,” a user agrees to Google’s “Terms of 
Service.”  However, a user will not find the Terms of Service on Google’s homepage; 
rather, he or she must first scroll to the bottom of the page, click on “Privacy and Terms” 
and then click on “Terms of Service” which takes the user to a third page where the 
actual terms governing his or her use are located.  See Privacy and Terms, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 13. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2006). 
 14. AMERICAN AIRLINES, http://www.aa.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 15. AA.COM SITE USAGE, http://www.aa.com/i18n/footer/siteUsage.jsp (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2013).  The introduction states: 
Thank you for visiting the American Airlines Web site titled “aa.com” . . . .  In 
return for gaining access to the Site and using it, you agree to be bound by the 
following Agreement without limitation or qualification, so please carefully 
review this Agreement before proceeding.  If you do not intend to be legally 
bound by these terms and conditions, do not access and use the Site.  American 
Airlines reserves the right to change this Agreement and to make changes to 
any of the products or programs described in the Site at any time without 
notice or liability.  Any such revisions are prospectively binding on you and 
therefore you should periodically visit this page when you use the Site to 
review the then current Agreement that binds you.  American Airlines also 
reserves the right in its sole and unfettered discretion to deny you access to the 
Site at any time. 
Id. 
6
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II.  THE LEGAL BACKDROP: PRESUMED ASSENT VIA 
 SHRINKWRAP AND CLICKWRAP 
A. Shrinkwrap Software Licensing: Early Victory 
Contract scholars began to closely examine Shrinkwrap licensing 
for defenses against their enforceability, and, prior to 1996, Shrinkwrap 
licenses were often invalidated in cases such as Step-Saver Data Systems, 
Inc. v. Wyse Technology.16  In this 1991 case decided by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court held that “the box-top license 
did not . . . constitute a conditional acceptance.”17  Under the common 
law requirements of contract formation, an agreement (i.e., a contract) 
cannot exist between two parties until one party has communicated an 
“offer” to enter into a contract.18  The second party must then “accept” 
the proposed offer by agreeing to the contracting terms.19  A contract 
does not come into existence until acceptance by the second party has 
been completed.20  Thus, the court in Step-Saver concluded that even a 
form licensing contract must disclose its terms to the second party, who 
must then accept those terms to create a contract.21 The Shrinkwrap 
EULA in Step-Saver specified that the act of opening the packaging 
constitutes acceptance to the seller’s contract terms.22  However, the 
court held that the Shrinkwrap was void because it contained additional 
unagreed upon terms to the original contract between the buyer and the 
seller.23  But Step-Saver proved to be an anomaly. 
In the 1996 landmark case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Shrinkwrap licenses were 
enforceable, valid contracts, stating: “Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable 
unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts 
in general (for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they 
are unconscionable).”24  The court considered the reasoning of earlier 
decisions on Shrinkwrap offer and acceptance and stated, “placing the 
package of software on the shelf is an ‘offer,’ which the customer 
‘accepts’ by paying the asking price and leaving the store with the 
 
 16. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 17. Id. at 103. 
 18. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22 (1981). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104. 
 22. Id. at 97. 
 23. Id. at 105–06. 
 24. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
7
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goods . . . . A contract includes only the terms on which the parties have 
agreed.  One cannot agree to hidden terms . . . .”25  But, the court then 
drew a distinction between ProCD’s licensing scheme and the earlier 
Shrinkwrap decisions, explaining:  
A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat 
as acceptance.  And that is what happened.  ProCD proposed a contract 
that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an 
opportunity to read the license at leisure.  This Zeidenberg did.  He had 
no choice, because the software splashed the license on the screen and 
would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance.  So although 
the district judge was right to say that a contract can be, and often is, 
formed simply by paying the price and walking out of the store, the UCC 
permits contracts to be formed in other ways.  ProCD proposed such a 
different way, and without protest Zeidenberg agreed.26 
Shrinkwrap licensing quickly became industry standard among 
software companies, and soon other related industries began to regularly 
package licensing agreements like software Shrinkwrap agreements.27  
Contract scholars in the 1990s criticized Shrinkwrap licenses on several 
grounds.28  As Mark Lemley wrote regarding the expansion of software 
Shrinkwrap contracts to contracts in other industries: 
The “assent” a user supposedly manifests to the terms of the license by 
opening the package and using the software is a thinly disguised fiction.  
The user may not read the license terms.  Also, it may be impossible or 
impractical for the user to comply with the license and reject the 
software for a number of reasons.  Overall the shrinkwrap license 
unilaterally and fundamentally changes the nature of the bargain 
between the parties, making it difficult or impossible for the user to 
object to whatever terms the vendor chooses to include.29 
Legal scholars were revolted by the use of one-sided terms found in 
Shrinkwrap EULAs, which soon became decried as adhesionary 
contracts—standard form agreements with no way to negotiate terms.30  
Commentators criticized the new adhesionary Shrinkwrap licenses as 
harmful because they became “trap[s] for the weak and unwary” 
 
 25. Id. at 1450. 
 26. Id. at 1452. 
 27. See Robert J. Morrill, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case 
Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 513 (1998). 
 28. See Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 317 
(1995). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) (1981). 
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consumers who had lost all bargaining power.31  Despite the efforts of 
countless contract scholars and authors of hundreds of articles 
examining various aspects of Shrinkwrap enforceability, in the wake of 
the ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg decision to enforce the ProCD EULA, 
Shrinkwrap agreements were considered generally enforceable by the 
late 1990s.32 
III. THE CLICKWRAP CONUNDRUM AND THE DEFEAT OF COMMON LAW 
CONTRACT FORMATION DEFENSES 
Clickwrap contracts built upon the success of cases like ProCD to 
analogize Clickwrap to Shrinkwrap.  Companies persuaded courts to 
construe Clickwrap as the legal equivalent to Shrinkwrap despite the 
lack of physical form to the contracts and the fact that assent was in the 
form of clicking a digital button instead of removing shrinkwrap 
packaging.33  Courts that encountered these new Clickwrap contracts 
used the 1990s case law on Shrinkwrap decisions to find the agreements 
generally enforceable notwithstanding several common law contract 
formation defenses regarding offer and acceptance.34  Consumers and 
legal scholars quickly mounted efforts to test the legitimacy of Clickwrap 
through a wide variety of contract defenses.35  Scholarly concerns over 
the validity of online licensing agreements have largely centered on the 
issues surrounding notice.36  As a general principle of contract law, a 
party may use a document to create a contract provided that it gives 
reasonable notice of its terms to the other party.37   
A tension exists between the classic legal requirement of notice and 
the design of websites because websites, by their nature, attempt to be 
user-friendly, providing ease of access without bothering users by 
quoting jarring legal information.  Website contracts are thus following 
the trend of a majority of paper contracts that have resorted to form 
 
 31. Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or 
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331, 351–55 (1996). 
 32. Nathan J. Davis, CYBERLAW: A. Note: Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of 
Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 598 (2007). 
 33. Id. at 583–89. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (2000). 
 36. See Ariz. Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763 
(1993). 
 37. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 33, 95 (1981). 
9
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language.  Some scholars described this as being so prevalent that “likely 
ninety-nine percent of paper contracts consist of standard forms.”38 
From a practical standpoint, alerting a user to the fact that he or she 
will be entering into a binding legal contract by clicking a button runs 
contrary to the design of digital licenses, which attempt to make 
transactions as “painless” and as quick as possible for consumers visiting 
a site.39  Despite a vigorous series of cases in every circuit challenging 
Clickwrap contracts, today such agreements are considered “generally 
enforceable.”40  For example, in Beard v. Paypal, Inc., the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Oregon suggested that Clickwrap agreements 
are now generally enforceable absent a showing of fraud––thus elevating 
Clickwrap agreements to the level of general enforceability that is given 
to more traditional offline contracts.41  In Exceptional Urgent Care Center 
I, Inc. v. ProtoMed Medical Management Corp., the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida upheld a Clickwrap contract on multiple 
grounds, stating even more succinctly that “there is also no dispute over 
the validity of clickwrap agreements.”42  
Some scholars critiqued Clickwrap contracts as an abuse of so-
called “rolling contracts,” where a user would buy a piece of software and 
agree to the Terms via Clickwrap agreement.43 Then the software 
company would “update” and change the licensing Terms without notice 
to users to make the license more restrictive, thus “rolling over” the 
assent given by the user initially as applicable to the new Terms.44  
Critics noted that it is highly implausible to expect that a software user 
would track down the new Terms and be able to decline the “update” of 
 
 38. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 431 (2002). 
 39. Walter A. Effross, A Web Site Checklist: Consider ‘Click-Wrap’ Pages, Linkage 
Disclaimers, and Forum Policies, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at S34, available at http:// 
www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/effross/legattimesweb22.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 40. Jackson v. American Plaza Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8980 (PKC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35847 at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009).  In 2010, courts, particularly in the Ninth 
Circuit, have gone further and have ruled that Clickwrap agreements are generally 
enforceable in all American jurisdictions.  See Davis, supra note 32, at 583; see also 
Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1226–27 (D. Haw. 2010). 
 41. Beard v. Paypal, Inc., No. 09–1339–JO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15517, at *2–5 (D. 
Or. Feb. 19, 2010). 
 42. Exceptional Urgent Care Ctr. I, Inc. v. ProtoMed Med. Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:08–
cv–284–Oc–10GRJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44787, at *31 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2009). 
 43. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744–45 
(2002). 
 44. See James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: 
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 114–15 (2003). 
10
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the EULA since most users would not even read the entirety of the initial 
agreement, much less its successor.45  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida tackled 
the issue of rolling contract assent in Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc.46  In this 
case, two plaintiffs had been buying and selling goods on Amazon 
Marketplace when Amazon.com refused to disburse funds in the 
plaintiffs’ “seller accounts.”47  This led the plaintiffs to sue in Florida, 
where they lived.48  Amazon.com then moved to dismiss the lawsuit 
since its website’s Terms of Service—which the plaintiffs assented to via 
Clickwrap agreement—included a forum selection clause that required 
claims be adjudicated in King County, Washington.49  Plaintiffs argued 
that they had never read the Clickwrap contract or any of the later 
updates to the contract, but the court concluded, “Plaintiffs’ admitted 
failure to read the Participation Agreement does not excuse compliance 
with its terms.”50  Segal and similar cases have lead to the general 
enforceability of Clickwrap contracts, despite arguments from plaintiffs 
that no assent was given and thus no contract was formed.51  
Another popular argument that appeared in court cases from the 
2000s attempted to overturn Clickwraps on unconscionability grounds.52  
Unconscionability is a defense against enforcing a contract on the 
grounds that the terms of the contract are excessively unfair to one 
party, and the fundamental inequality of the agreement voids the 
contract’s “consideration.”53  Under contract law, all agreements must 
have some value or consideration from both parties before the contract is 
considered binding.54  Legal commentators pointed to the overuse of 
standard forms in EULAs as evidence that no meaningful negotiation 
took place between the contracting parties and argued that the relative 
 
 45. See Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1368. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1369. 
 51. Id.  See also Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236–37 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
 52. See Brian R. Suffredini, Practical Guidelines for Creating Enforceable Online 
Agreements, INTERNATIONAL IT AND OUTSOURCING NEWSLETTER, Issue 2 (Oct. 17, 2003). 
 53. Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 765, 771 (1977). 
 54. A.G. Chloros, The Doctrine of Consideration and the Reform of the Law of Contract: 
A Comparative Analysis, 17 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 137, 139 (1968). 
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bargaining power was so unequal as to invalidate Clickwrap contracts.55  
Scholars contended that the saturation of form contracts in standard 
Clickwrap agreements created fundamentally unfair contracting climates 
online.56  
Another popular criticism of Clickwrap agreements is that many of 
these EULAs only display the contract terms after payment.57  For 
example, a user may click through a series of screens to license and pay 
for a piece of software upfront, but only after downloading the program 
finally encounter the license terms or be informed that the licensing 
agreement may be found in an accompanying user manual or later e-
mail.58  This is a process that mimics the Shrinkwrap contracting 
method.  Interestingly, in these instances, courts have split on whether 
Clickwrap contracts should be generally enforceable.59  
It is important to note that despite the wide range of cases 
discussing the legality of Clickwrap agreements, courts have yet to 
articulate a clear standard defining the elements necessary to create a 
valid Clickwrap contract.  Perhaps the closest decision to an articulable 
standard came from a district court within the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit in Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Management, L.L.C.60  
The district court noted that there is still a considerable dispute over 
what is required to make a Clickwrap agreement enforceable, but 
suggested that Clickwrap agreements are enforceable so long as there is a 
button with some indication that clicking amounts to acceptance.61  In 
Grosvenor v. Qwest Communications Intern. Inc., the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Colorado agreed that there is a need for a button to 
signify that clicking equals assent.62  It enunciated that requirement, 
 
 55. See Hillman, supra note 43, at 751. 
 56. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of 
E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840–41 (2006). 
 57. See Sean F. Crotty, The How and Why of Shrinkwrap License Validation Under the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 745, 764 (2002). 
 58. See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957(JCH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18132, at *19 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2011), aff’d, 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 59. See id.; see also Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst L.L.C., No. 3: 06-CV-0891-
B, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230 (N.D. Tex. 2007). 
 60. Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt, L.L.C., 18 A.3d 210, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2011). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Grosvenor v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 09-CV-2848-WDM-KMT, 2010 
WL at 3906253 *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010). 
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss1/2
2. GARCIA_FINAL 1/17/2014  5:36 PM 
2013] A SOLUTION TO THE CLICKWRAP CONUNDRUM 43 
stating, “as a rule, a clickwrap is valid where the terms of the agreement 
appear on the same screen with the button the user must click.”63 
Simply put, the Clickwrap conundrum can be summed up as the 
status quo today.  Legal scholars and users are extremely uncomfortable 
with the lack of notice and oppressive terms inherent to the user 
experience with EULA Clickwraps.  However, courts in every circuit 
have held Clickwrap contracts to be valid, “settl[ing] on a mechanical 
assent analysis that only seeks to determine whether or not the ‘I Agree’ 
button was indeed clicked[,]”64 even in extreme situations beyond 
traditional adhesionary contract parameters.65  Regardless of the near 
universal dislike among legal experts and users for EULAs, regulatory 
attempts through the Uniform Commercial Code to alleviate the 
concerns regarding EULAs, and Clickwrap in particular, have stalled.66  
The rise of Browsewrap has amplified the problems of Clickwrap due to 
even more extreme lack of notice, conflicting understandings of website 
“use,” and unspecified points of acceptance.  
IV. A SURVEY OF BROWSEWRAP CASE LAW AND 
 THE LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL RELIEF 
A. Initial Browsewrap Cases: Hybrid Digital Contracts 
The term “Browsewrap” was mentioned early on in the 2000 case, 
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., where the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California considered the legality of a Clickwrap agreement 
and remarked, “No reported cases have ruled on the enforceability of a 
browse wrap license.”67  Judicial silence on Browsewrap contracts ended 
in 2002 with the Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. decision, 
which is today considered the seminal case on Browsewrap contracts.68  
In Specht, Netscape attempted to compel arbitration pursuant to a hybrid 
Clickwrap-Browsewrap contract and dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Davis, supra note 32, at 598 (2007). 
 65. A contract of adhesion exists where “one party has absolutely no bargaining 
power or ability to change the contract terms.”  See In re H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 17 
S.W.3d 360, 370–71 (Tex. App. 2000) (noting that a contract of adhesion is not 
automatically unconscionable). 
 66. See Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its 
Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 419 
(2003). 
 67. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 68. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 23–24 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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that Netscape’s software was illegally monitoring online activities.69  
Specht foreshadowed many future Browsewrap cases since the 
underlying issue was the plaintiffs’ attempt to contest the mandatory 
arbitration clause in a forum of the company’s choosing within the 
EULA.70  As detailed in some recent Browsewrap surveys,71 arbitration 
clauses are almost always part of the standard EULAs found in websites 
with Browsewrap contracts, such as AstronomyDaily.com,72 multi-
map.com,73 dell.com,74 ubizen.com,75 and nokia.com.76  All of these 
EULAs have clauses stating that mere use or navigation to the website 
constitutes acceptance of the company’s Terms of Service, which in turn 
includes an exclusive jurisdiction clause.77 
Netscape offered several toolbar and search plug-in options to users 
that employed standard Clickwrap agreements where users needed to 
signify their assent to the displayed terms before they could download 
the software.78  Notably, the software contained a software plug-in called 
“Communicator.”79  Netscape also offered a software download called 
“SmartDownload” that was bundled with Communicator but could be 
downloaded separately and did not display license terms on the same 
screen.80  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted: 
The signal difference between downloading Communicator and 
downloading SmartDownload was that no clickwrap presentation 
accompanied the latter operation.  Instead, once plaintiffs . . . clicked on 
the “Download” button located at or near the bottom of their screen, and 
 
 69. Id. at 20–21. 
 70. Id. at 20. 
 71. Lisa Arrasmith, Browsewrap Clauses in Current Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap 
Contracts, CPTECH.ORG, http://www.cptech.org/ecom/ucita/licenses/browsewrap.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 72. Usage Agreement, ASTRONOMY DAILY, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20100816155010/http://www.astronomydaily.com/usage.html (last visited Sept. 16, 
2013). 
 73. Conditions of Use, MULTIMAP, http://web.archive.org/web/20100516094343/ 
http://www.multimap.com/tacondit.htm (last viewed on Sept 16, 2013). 
 74. Terms and Conditions, DELL, http://www.dell.com/us/en/gen/misc/policy_007_ 
policy.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 75. UBIZEN, Web site Use Policy, http://web.archive.org/web/20050312022737/http:// 
www.ubizen.com/_website_use_policy/ (last visited on Sept. 16, 2013). 
 76. Site Terms, NOKIA, http://www.nokia.com/global/terms/terms/terms/terms-
conditions/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 77. See supra notes 72–76. 
 78. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 22–23. 
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the downloading of SmartDownload was complete, these plaintiffs 
encountered no further information about the plug-in program or the 
existence of license terms governing its use.81 
The only reference to any licensing terms for SmartDownload was 
located on a separate screen that essentially hid the program’s contract 
terms from users until after the download had already taken place.82  
Furthermore, the website suggested the Terms were identical to the 
“Communicator” program, perhaps to make users believe they need not 
read the Terms.83  Ultimately, the court in Specht determined, “a 
consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent 
to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that 
clicking on the download button would signify assent to those terms.”84  
The court did not preclude the possibility that valid online contracts 
could be formed via Clickwrap or Browsewrap, or through a hybrid such 
as the bundled Clickwrap and Browsewrap SmartDownload contract.85  
However, the court did issue a strong warning to similar actors: 
“Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and 
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are 
essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”86 
The court did not agree with the defendants’ arguments that 
Browsewrap cases must necessarily be decided in line with the older 
Clickwrap cases.87  Instead, the court spoke at length of cases like 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg as examples of assent “by conduct.”88  The 
Specht decision suggested that the clicking of a download button should 
be accompanied by “reasonably conspicuous” notice, leaving open for 
interpretation the instances where notice of the contract terms was 
ambiguous. 
Interestingly, the Specht decision foreshadowed many of the 
common issues associated with Browsewrap cases.  One of the Specht 
plaintiffs never visited the Netscape website where the download was 
available, but instead downloaded the software from a third party site 
 
 81. Id. at 23. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 29–30. 
 85. Id. at 32–34. 
 86. Id. at 35. 
 87. Id. at 32–33.  However, some argue that Browsewrap and Clickwrap processes 
are in essence legally identical because “if we refuse to enforce browsewraps, a site owner 
will simply impose the same restrictions via clickwrap or shrinkwrap.”  Lemley, supra 
note 13, at 469. 
 88. Id. at 32–33 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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that contained a hyperlink for “more information.”89  This link then 
directed the user to yet another page within the Netscape domain where 
the Terms could be viewed.90  Thus, this plaintiff would have needed to 
navigate through multiple pages on two different companies’ websites to 
even determine the threshold question of whether the software was 
bound by a license. 
The existence of a discrete moment when a user could assent or 
decline also sets this case apart from several later iterations of 
Browsewrap agreements.  Netscape’s terms were conditioned upon a 
specific user act, which can be isolated and examined––namely, the 
moment when the plaintiffs downloaded the software.  In many ways, 
Netscape’s bundled software, “SmartDownload Communicator,” is an 
example of a bygone era from the early 2000s when software licensing 
was still the main vehicle of online agreements.  
B. Notice via User Action 
One would expect that the judicial landscape after Specht would 
reflect the strong admonishment from the opinion in favor of 
conspicuous notice and informed consent.  Instead, many later 
Browsewrap cases follow an opposing trend where the manifestation of 
assent to EULA terms is increasingly ambiguous.  Hybrid Clickwrap-
Browsewrap contracts where a user completed a discrete act, like 
downloading a program or clicking “I Agree,” seem to have made the 
lack of conspicuous contract terms less troubling for courts after Specht. 
 
 89. Id. at 24–25. 
 90. The court in Specht stated: 
Unlike the four named user plaintiffs who downloaded SmartDownload from 
the Netscape website, the fifth named plaintiff, Michael Fagan, claims to have 
downloaded the plug-in program from a “shareware” website operated by 
ZDNet, an entity unrelated to Netscape.  Shareware sites are websites, 
maintained by companies or individuals, that contain libraries of free, publicly 
available software.  The pages that a user would have seen while downloading 
SmartDownload from ZDNet differed from those that he or she would have 
encountered while downloading SmartDownload from the Netscape website.  
Notably, instead of any kind of notice of the SmartDownload license 
agreement, the ZDNet pages offered only a hypertext link to “more 
information” about SmartDownload, which, if clicked on, took the user to a 
Netscape webpage that, in turn, contained a link to the license agreement.  
Thus, a visitor to the ZDNet website could have obtained SmartDownload, as 
Fagan avers he did, without ever seeing a reference to that program’s license 
terms, even if he or she had scrolled through all of ZDNet’s webpages. 
Id. at 24–25. 
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For example, in Van Tassell v. United Marketing Group, LLC, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted, “[b]ecause 
clickwrap agreements require affirmative action on the part of the user 
to manifest assent, courts regularly uphold their validity when 
challenged.”91  Here, plaintiffs had been automatically enrolled in a 
“United Marketing Membership” program after making a purchase on 
another website that passed the plaintiffs’ credit card information on to 
United Marketing.92  The consumers’ automatic enrollment into the 
Membership Program was only disclosed in the Terms and Conditions, 
and a direct link to the Terms and Conditions was not provided on the 
original purchase website.93  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the defendants in 
Van Tassell also unsuccessfully attempted to compel arbitration per their 
Terms and Conditions and have the suit dismissed entirely.94  The court 
did not question the accessibility of the Terms and Conditions; instead, 
it focused on the conspicuousness of the Terms and Conditions.95  In 
order for a user to have found out that her purchases were subject to a 
digital contract, the user not only would have had to scroll down 
without reason to do so, but also would have had to “make the illogical 
leap that ‘Customer Service’ means binding ‘Conditions of Use’ and click 
on that link,” which finally redirected the user to another webpage 
where the Terms of Service was contained.96  
Again, the court was able to point to a discrete moment when users 
should have received notice regarding the website’s Conditions of Use—
the point of purchase on the websites.  The Van Tassell court seemed to 
conclude that the lack of notice at that moment, coupled with the 
multistep process users would have needed to undertake to find the 
Terms and Conditions, made the EULA unenforceable.  Unfortunately, 
decisions like Van Tassell and Specht where Browsewrap EULAs were 
invalidated are more often the exception rather than the rule among the 
circuit courts today. 
In the 2005 Illinois decision, Hubbert v. Dell Corp., users purchased 
computers on Dell’s website, which required each user to customize his 
or her own computer by configuring the model and type.97  On five of 
 
 91. Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 790 (N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
 92. Id. at 774. 
 93. Id. at 788–89. 
 94. Id. at 789–93. 
 95. Id. at 790–93. 
 96. Id. at 792. 
 97. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 117–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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those customization pages, “[Dell’s] ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’ were 
accessible by clicking on a blue hyperlink.”98  The plaintiffs sued Dell for 
false advertising regarding the speed of the computers’ processors.99  The 
court considered whether a mandatory arbitration clause was part of the 
contract created between the parties when users purchased computers 
on Dell’s website, Dell.com, which listed its Terms and Conditions of 
Service on another webpage, but within the same website as the point of 
purchase.100  The court analogized the location of the Terms elsewhere 
on the website as the modern day equivalent of “page turning” and found 
that hyperlinking in blue-colored type was conspicuous enough for Dell 
to overcome the charge of unconscionability.101  Generally, for a court to 
void a contract on the basis of unconscionability, a contract must be 
substantively and procedurally unconscionable.102  Here, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the agreement was excessively one-sided and thus, lacked 
the consideration necessary to form a valid contract.103  Additionally, the 
plaintiffs argued that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable 
because the website users lacked notice of the contract terms, which 
were accessible only via hyperlink.104  In response, the court stated: 
The blue hyperlink simply takes a person to another page of the 
contract, similar to turning the page of a written paper contract.  
Although there is no conspicuousness requirement, the hyperlink’s 
contrasting blue type makes it conspicuous.  Common sense dictates 
that because the plaintiffs were purchasing computers online, they were 
not novices when using computers.  A person using a computer quickly 
learns that more information is available by clicking on a blue 
hyperlink.105 
Thus, the court held that the Browsewrap agreement Terms could not be 
invalidated on substantive and procedural unconscionability grounds, 
and the court ordered the dispute to mandatory arbitration.106  Merely 
displaying a hyperlink satisfied conspicuousness requirements.107  The 
court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that Dell should have used a 
Clickwrap to display the Terms and Conditions of Service and suggested 
 
 98. Id. at 118. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 120–21. 
 101. Id. at 121. 
 102. Id. at 124. 
 103. Id. at 120–21. 
 104. Id. at 124. 
 105. Id. at 121. 
 106. Id. at 126. 
 107. Id. at 121. 
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that Browsewraps were the equivalent of Clickwrap agreements when 
blue hyperlinks were displayed.108 
The Hubbert case would, at first glance, appear to set a reasonable 
standard for displaying Terms and Conditions.  However, Pollstar v. 
Gigmania,109 decided in 2000, is cited significantly more than Hubbert, 
decided in 2005.110  In Pollstar, the court made a determination in direct 
contrast to Hubbert on the question of display.111  Pollstar alleged that 
Gigmania copied information from the Pollstar website for use on its 
own competing site, which violated Pollstar’s Terms of Service.112  The 
court considered whether a contract had been created by the 
Browsewrap license from the main page of Pollstar’s website, which had 
a very small notice.  In determining whether the notice was valid, the 
court stated: 
This license agreement is not set forth on the homepage but is on a 
different web page that is linked to the homepage.  However, the visitor 
is alerted to the fact that “use is subject to license agreement” because of 
the notice in small gray print on gray background . . . . [M]any users 
presumably are not aware that the license agreement is linked to the 
homepage.  In addition, the homepage also has small blue text which 
when clicked on, does not link to another page.  This may confuse 
visitors . . . .113 
However, the court determined that gray text on a gray background 
signified meaningful notice to a user that she was entering into a valid 
online contract.114  This defies the original standard of “[r]easonably 
conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms” from the seminal 
Browsewrap decision in Specht.115  Users would effectively have had to 
highlight random portions of Pollstar’s website in order to determine 
that the hidden text existed at all, much less the fact that the hidden text 
signified the creation of a legally binding agreement.   
C. Off-Site Notice 
Perhaps an even more troubling string of cases holds that “notice” of 
Browsewrap contract terms does not need to accompany website 
 
 108. Id. at 120–22. 
 109. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 110. Hubbert, 835 N.E.2d 113. 
 111. See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
 112. Id. at 976–77. 
 113. Id. at 981. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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browsing, but can instead be delivered offline after browsing has already 
taken place.  For example, in Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., the Florida 
Third District Court of Appeal held that Briceño was bound by an online 
“amendment” to a telephone services contract that obligated her to 
arbitrate disputes with the telephone service company.116  The court 
determined that Briceño had received notice as a result of her receipt of 
an invoice that notified her of the amendment and of a location on the 
Internet at which she could view its terms.117  In addition, the court 
concluded that she was afforded the opportunity to cancel her contract if 
she did not wish to be bound, despite the fact that she neither read the 
terms of the Amendment, nor in any way affirmatively indicated her 
assent to be bound by its terms.118  Unlike the situations in Hubbert or 
Van Tassell, Briceño’s contract was created offline, through a rolling 
contract with her telephone company that “updated” her agreement to 
include a new mandatory arbitration clause that could only be viewed 
online at the company’s website.119 
Similarly, in Southwest Airlines Company v. BoardFirst L.L.C., the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that 
BoardFirst had the requisite knowledge that using the plaintiff’s website 
would form a valid Browsewrap contract by virtue of its receipt of the 
cease and desist letters from Southwest Airlines once litigation had 
commenced.120  BoardFirst offered its customers the ability to board 
flights earlier than other passengers in return for a small fee.121  
Southwest Airlines does not have set boarding times for passengers and 
instead creates the boarding order based on the time that a passenger 
“checked in” on the Southwest website.122  BoardFirst would “check in” 
for its customers on the Southwest website so the customers could be 
placed at the top of the boarding order, in boarding group A.123  The 
Southwest website had a Browsewrap contract in place that forbade use 
of the “check in” service to any user other than the individual 
passenger.124  Southwest Airlines sued BoardFirst alleging that the 
company had violated the Terms and Conditions on its website and 
 
 116. Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 117. Id. at 180–81. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 178. 
 120. Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96230, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). 
 121. Id. at *4. 
 122. Id. at *1–3. 
 123. Id. at *3–4. 
 124. Id. at *5. 
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sought an injunction to stop BoardFirst’s use of Southwest.com.125  
BoardFirst claimed it lacked knowledge of any contract terms and that it 
did not enter into any agreement with Southwest Airlines.126  
The court held that off-site notice of the Browsewrap existed 
because BoardFirst at least had knowledge of the Terms as early as when 
Kate Bell, BoardFirst’s founder, received the December 20, 2005 cease-
and-desist letter from Southwest.127  Southwest argued that “in 
continuing to use the Southwest site despite having actual knowledge of 
the Terms, BoardFirst effectively manifested its acceptance of 
Southwest’s ‘offer’ to use the site subject to the Terms, thus forming a 
binding contract between the parties.”128  Here, the court decided that 
BoardFirst received notice of the existence of the Browsewrap agreement 
when it received a letter stating that the Terms of Service applied to use 
of the website.129  Interestingly, the court did not consider how the 
acceptance of the Terms in December of 2005 affected BoardFirst’s 
earlier activity on the Southwest website.  So, unlike the earlier 
Browsewrap cases like Hubbert and Gigmania, where the courts inferred 
notice from small type at the bottom of the websites, in BoardFirst, the 
court further diminished the notice requirement, concluding that notice 
of the Browsewrap, occurring in the form of a letter relating to a current 
lawsuit, was sufficient.130  
In 2011, Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp. broke with this line of cases by 
voiding a hybrid Clickwrap-Browsewrap and holding that “simple 
reference to a ‘welcome email’ is a far cry from the language necessary to 
indicate manifest agreement to the later email’s terms and conditions.”131  
In Schnabel, after the plaintiff consumers made purchases from a variety 
of websites, a pop-up advertisement window appeared asking if they 
would like to save money through the “Great Fun” discount program.132  
A small box inside the advertisement asked for the consumer’s city of 
birth, which when entered prompted another pop-up window displaying 
the following language: “Thanks for trying Great Fun! Watch for your 
welcome email, arriving soon.  Also, in approximately two business days 
 
 125. Id. at *33–34. 
 126. Id. at *11–21. 
 127. Id. at *13. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 20–21. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957(JCH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18132, at *19 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2011), aff’d, 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 132. Id. at *1–3. 
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(excluding holidays) you’ll receive an email with instructions on how to 
get your gift.  If we can’t send the email, we’ll automatically mail you the 
details.”133  The Terms and Conditions of the website were contained in 
the “welcome e-mail” from Trilegiant, which all of the plaintiffs denied 
receiving.134 
Here, it is difficult to pinpoint when this hybrid Clickwrap-
Browsewrap contract would have been created.  Some plaintiffs believed 
that they were still communicating with the original website, not 
Trilegiant’s pop-up advertisement.135  Furthermore, a user entering her 
city of birth hardly constitutes the classic “I agree” action seen in most 
Clickwrap contracts.  The plaintiffs interacted with a small pop-up 
advertisement window instead of a full website, and the window did not 
even contain a way to access the full website, let alone the Terms and 
Conditions.136  The Schnabel decision to void the hybrid Clickwrap-
Browsewrap is a significant break from decisions like Sprint Spectrum 
and BoardFirst.137  However, since Schnabel did not enforce the off-site 
contract Terms and Conditions, this further complicates any prediction 
of the outcome of future litigation. 
D. Spiders and Robots: Notice by Automated Computer Program 
Another vein of Browsewrap cases which is in some ways even more 
troubling to proponents of traditional contracting principles involves the 
enforceability of Browsewrap agreements where the only contact 
between the website and the alleged contracting party is through an 
automated piece of software similar to a customized search program.  
This software, known as a trawling spider, robot, or query program, 
gathers data from a website which then attempts to enforce the website 
Terms and Conditions on the owner of the robot, most often for the 
purpose of compelling arbitration.138 
The earliest of these cases was in 2004 in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, 
Inc. where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered 
whether the use of a search robot to access a website subjected the 
 
 133. Id. at *3. 
 134. Id. at *4–6. 
 135. Id. at *4. 
 136. Id. at *12. 
 137. See Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005); Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 96230 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). 
 138. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
7–8 (2007). 
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robot’s owner to the website Browsewrap agreement.139  In this case, the 
robot was designed to automatically submit queries to a registrar of 
domain names under the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN).140  Verio created the search robot to retrieve 
registration information on newly registered domain names.141  Verio 
would also market its web design services to new domain name 
registrants, assuming that these entities would be in need of web 
designers.142  At the time Verio began querying the database, Register’s 
website’s Terms of Use, called a “restrictive legend,” prohibited the use of 
the ICANN information for “mass solicitations ‘via email.’”143  Register 
received complaints from users about contact from Verio by e-mail, 
telephone and direct mail, so it changed the Terms of Use to prohibit 
solicitations by direct mail and telephone as well.144  Verio complied 
with the original Terms and stopped sending mass-market e-mails, but 
“refused to stop marketing by direct mail and telephone.”145  The court 
held that Register could impose new conditions so long as they were 
within the parameters of the conditions for access to ICANN, and the 
court further stated that Verio could only pursue its policy violation 
arguments through the administrative ICANN process.146  
On the subject of the search robot, the court concluded that 
because Verio submitted multiple queries to the database website, Verio 
had received notice of the website Terms of Use, but it declined to 
explain how Verio actually received such notice.147  Instead, the court 
stated, “[f]urthermore, Verio admits that it knew perfectly well what 
terms Register demanded.  Verio’s argument [that it failed to receive 
notice because only the robot visited the site where the conditions were 
available] fails.”148  The court even went on to state puzzlingly that, 
“Verio visited Register’s computers daily to access WHOIS data [the new 
ICANN entries] and each day saw the terms of Register’s offer”—thus 
imputing the search robot’s page views and EULA “knowledge” with 
Verio’s own!149  The court made no distinction between use of a website 
 
 139. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 140. Id. at 395–96. 
 141. Id. at 396. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 397. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 400–01. 
 147. Id. at 401. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 402. 
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by an individual and an automated program, which moves the classic 
contract requirements of offer and acceptance further away from the 
reality of Browsewrap litigation.150 
A year later in 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California in Cairo, Inc. v. CrossMedia Services, Inc. held that 
the defendant’s Browsewrap agreement, which stated that an agreement 
would be created if a user continued to utilize the site, provided 
sufficient notice and was binding on users.151  Here, the plaintiff only 
accessed the CrossMedia Services website through an automated 
program.152  However, the court imputed knowledge to the plaintiff 
arising out of repeated use of the site via a “robot” that automatically 
monitored the site, stating: “Cairo’s repeated and automated use of 
CMS’s web pages can form the basis of imputing knowledge to Cairo of 
the terms on which CMS’s services were offered even before Cairo’s 
notice of CMS’s cease and desist letter.”153  The court thoroughly 
reviewed the actual notice received from the cease and desist letter and 
drew a distinction between past use of the website prior to the actual 
notice, and the use of the website from that point forward—a distinction 
the court in Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C. ignored.154  In 
CrossMedia, the court definitively held that repeated use of a website by 
an automated program imputes knowledge of the content of that 
website––in essence allowing the program use of the website to function 
as the legal equivalent of actual individual use.155  
E. Some Conclusions  
Even these few cases on Browsewrap reveal a startling new 
landscape for website users—they are more likely to inadvertently 
become subject to Browsewrap agreements with very restrictive terms.  
Take for instance, the Terms and Conditions from the Fujifilm Australia 
website: 
This FUJIFILM Australia Website (“Website”) is owned and operated by 
FUJIFILM Australia Pty Ltd (ABN 80 000 064 433) (“the Company”).  
Your access to the Website is conditional upon your acceptance and 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Cairo, Inc. v. CrossMedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8450, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2005). 
 152. Id. at *6–7. 
 153. Id. at *13–14. 
 154. See Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96230, at *21 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). 
 155. CrossMedia, at *14. 
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compliance with these terms and conditions, the FUJIFILM Australia Pty 
Ltd Privacy Policy, notices, disclaimers and any other terms and 
conditions or other statements contained on the Website (known 
collectively as “Terms of Use”).  Your use of, and/or access to, the 
Website constitutes your agreement to the Terms of Use.  The Company 
reserves the right to amend the Terms of Use at any time at its sole 
discretion.156  
As in this example, many websites now routinely state that any browsing 
on its website, however brief, constitutes “use” of the website subject to 
its EULA, which a user “assents” to merely by visiting the website.  
Further, the website can modify the terms of the EULA at any time 
without notice to the user under the theory of “rolling assent.”157  The 
Terms of Service usually contain some kind of mandatory binding 
arbitration agreement, effectively cutting off judicial relief to users.  
Between the widespread use of binding arbitration and the 
increased use of Browsewrap agreements with no specified point of 
assent, courts have been unable to draw any meaningful distinction 
between Browsewrap and Clickwrap.  Courts now routinely uphold 
Clickwrap EULAs, and by equating Clickwrap to Browsewrap, courts 
have essentially given websites free reign to write more and more 
restrictive Browsewrap agreements that will be upheld as binding 
contracts.  The small number of Browsewrap cases where plaintiffs have 
successfully invalidated EULAs share one common element––a point in 
time that the court could specifically identify as the moment when 
notice should have been provided, such as completing a sale (Van 
Tassell)158 or downloading software (Specht).159  But, with more recent 
Browsewrap language, such as the Fujifilm Browsewrap stated above, 
where the assenting behavior is merely accessing the website rather than 
completing a specific action, it is very difficult to identify a moment 
when the website should have provided notice.160  The ambiguous point 
 
 156. FUJIFILM AUSTRALIA, Website Terms of Use, http://www.fujifilm.com.au/terms-and-
conditions/website-terms-of-use (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 157. As seen in language from the Terms of Service for popular websites like Yahoo!: 
Yahoo! provides the Yahoo! Services (defined below) to you subject to the 
following Terms of Service (“TOS”), which may be updated by us from time to 
time without notice to you . . . By accessing and using the Yahoo! Services, you 
accept and agree to be bound by the terms and provision of the TOS. 
YAHOO!, Terms of Service, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
 158. See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770 (N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
 159. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 160. See FUJIFILM AUSTRALIA, supra note 156. 
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of assent remains problematic for digital EULA litigants because courts 
have difficulty setting a standard of behavior for websites that would 
invalidate a specific EULA while still upholding the general principles of 
EULA enforceability, per the substantial case law from Clickwrap and 
Shrinkwrap agreements. 
It is also important to underscore another commonality between 
nearly all Browsewrap cases—websites’ attempts to quash potential 
lawsuits through mandatory arbitration clauses.  As the cases above 
note, nearly every website involved in Browsewrap disputes not only 
employed arbitration clauses, but required mandatory binding 
arbitration in forums convenient to the contracting websites.  These few 
cases represent only the tip of a much larger iceberg, where a majority of 
potential plaintiffs are shepherded into arbitration agreements that they 
cannot easily challenge.  
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE EULA CONTROVERSY: 
A SERIES OF LEGISLATIVE DEAD ENDS 
In 1999, it was difficult to predict how the Internet would be used 
for commercial activity.  However, most legal scholars recognized the 
need for regulation of sales and leases for intangible goods such as 
intellectual property.161  The American Law Institute (ALI) and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) responded to vocal concerns from legal scholars over the 
encroaching and pervasive use of Shrinkwrap licenses and began writing 
a model act on digital commercial activity, known as UCC Amendment 
2B or UCC2B.162  UCC2B was drafted to close the gaps in online 
transaction regulation, especially those affecting intangible goods, such 
as licensing agreements.  In 2002, the American Bar Association 
Working Group report on UCC2B stated: 
[UCC2B] is an enactment similar to Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (the “UCC”).  However, whereas Article 2 governs 
sales of goods, UCITA [UCC2B] applies to licenses of computer software 
and other computer information transactions.  A codification of the law 
governing computer information transactions was thought necessary 
 
 161. See generally Andres Sawicki, Comment, Repeat Infringement in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (2006). 
 162. For more information on other contemporaneous viewpoints, see Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for 
Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998); see also Daniel C. 
Miller, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License Agreements, 22. 
REV. LITIG. 435 (2003). 
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since computer information transactions had become a significant factor 
in the national and even international economy.  Moreover, publishers of 
computer software and providers of information databases in electronic 
form usually “license” their products or access to their information, 
rather than selling or leasing the products or information outright.163  
However, the ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg decision to uphold the validity of 
Shrinkwrap licenses changed “the dynamics of [the UCC2B] 
negotiations.”164  The UCC2B proposal grew in scope until ALI withdrew 
support from the project altogether and the effort was renamed the 
Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA).165  
UCITA was a broad attempt to reorder intersecting laws on 
intellectual property, digital contracting, and the Internet.  In this 
attempt, UCITA redefined software sales to be generally construed as 
licenses, not goods, so that individual buyers would not have any 
ownership rights over software.166  Instead, buyers would be subject to 
sellers’ restrictions, which would be determined by individual contracts 
between the parties.167  UCITA also allows software vendors to limit their 
individual liability for defective products, which some commentators 
argued would allow software companies to engage in fraudulent business 
practices by contracting out of liability.168  Criticism of UCITA grew and 
due to organized opposition, NCCUSL’s efforts to enact the proposal at 
the state level failed miserably.  By 2003 commentators stated, “UCITA 
has generated unceasing controversy since its inception that has not 
abated with the recent amendments,” and that they regard “UCITA as a 
highly flawed piece of legislation.”169  UCITA also drew stiff opposition 
from librarian organizations.  The American Library Association joined 
 
 163. John M. Vittone, American Bar Association Working Group Report on the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2–3 (Jan. 31, 2002), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/ucita.authcheckdam. 
pdf. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/computer_information_transactions/ucita_final_02.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
 166. See Brian D. McDonald, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 464–65 (2001). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Controversy, THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTION ACT: 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN SOFTWARE CONTRACT LAW, http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/ 
~eroberts/cs181/projects/ucita/controversy.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
 169. Letter from Emily Sheketoff, Exec. Dir., Am. Library Ass’n, et al., to the President 
and House of Delegates, Am. Bar Ass’n (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http:// 
archive.ala.org/washoff/ucita/ABAltr0203.pdf. 
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with the Association of Research Libraries, the American Association of 
Law Libraries, the Special Libraries Association, the Medical Library 
Association, and the Art Libraries Society of North American to create a 
national coalition entitled Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce 
Transactions (AFFECT), to oppose UCITA.170  
AFFECT found much to criticize in the proposed UCC2B and 
divided its concerns into five main categories: (1) “Software purchased 
would no longer belong to the buyer;”171 (2) “UCITA would permit 
invasions of privacy;”172 (3) “Software companies could knowingly ship 
defective products;”173 (4) “UCITA would allow software to be disabled 
without notification;”174 and (5) “UCITA would threaten existing 
 
 170. See Who We Are, AMERICANS FOR FAIR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20021201180218/http://ucita.com/who.html (last visited Oct. 
16, 2013). 
 171. The website lists the following reasons under this category: 
UCITA valids [sic] a business model under which licensees are bound to the 
terms in “shrink-wrap” or “click-on” agreements merely by opening a package 
or clicking “I agree” to a usually lengthly [sic], complicated agreement. 
UCITA allows restrictions on use to be revealed after purchase. 
UCITA allows software publishers to change the terms of the contract after 
purchase. 
UCITA allows software vendors to prohibit the transfer of software from one 
person to another or from one company to another, even in the course of a 
merger or acquisition. 
UCITA allows terms that may severely limit the use of the product. 
UCITA allows restrictions that prohibit users from criticizing or publicly 
commenting on software they purchased. 
Why We Oppose UCITA, AMERICANS FOR FAIR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, 
http://www.ucita.com/why.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). 
 172. Id. (“UCITA allows software publishers to legally track and collect confidential 
information about personal and business activities of licensees. UCITA allows software 
and information products to contain ‘back door’ entrances, potentially making users’ 
systems vulnerable to infiltration by unauthorized hackers.”). 
 173. The website lists the following reasons under this category: 
UCITA allows software publishers to deny both large and small businesses 
many of the current warranty protections they have under present law. 
UCITA valids [sic] a business model in which software publishers may sell 
their products “as is” and disclaim liability for product shortcomings. Imagine 
buying a refrigerator or stove where the producer does not guarantee that the 
product will work correctly. 
If the consumer wants to sue over a defective product, UCITA allows the 
software publisher to restrict legal action to a specific jurisdiction––a particular 
county, state or even a different country. 
Id. 
 174. The website lists the following reasons under this category: 
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privileges granted under federal copyright laws.”175 AFFECT has nearly 
40 active member organizations including multiple consumer rights 
groups and large companies, such as ConocoPhillips and Boeing.176  
AFFECT wrote the following warning regarding UCITA: 
If signed into law in any state, UCITA will undermine consumer and 
privacy protections.  This proposed legislation would change the rules 
for purchase and use of computer software and information products for 
businesses, individuals and non-profits.  And if successful, UCITA will 
cost software consumers billions.  In essence, the UCITA legislation 
validates a “shrink-wrap” or “click-on” approach to electronic licensing, 
superseding consumer protections, copyright law, and privacy 
protections.177 
AFFECT’s warnings proved to be accurate and notwithstanding the 
failure of UCITA, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg paved the way for judicial 
acceptance of EULAs.178  Within one year, NCCUSL’s proposed model 
statutes had only been adopted by two states, Maryland and Virginia, 
which remain the only states to have adopted UCITA to the present 
day.179  Three states were so outraged by the proposed UCITA legislation 
 
UCITA allows software publishers to shut down mission critical software 
remotely without court approval and without incurring liability for the 
foreseeable harm caused. 
UCITA allows software publishers to modify the terms of contracts after the 
sale simply by sending an e-mail––regardless of whether the consumer receives 
the notification or not. 
UCITA allows software publishers to remove their product, simply because 
usage fees arrive late. 
UCITA puts consumers at the mercy of software publishers to “blackmail” users 
for more fees by their unhindered ability to disable or remove their product for 
unspecified “license violations.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 175. The website lists the following reasons under this category: 
UCITA would permit an end-run around federal copyright law in mass-market 
licensing agreements that are used by virtually all consumers and that are the 
mainstay of most library and business operations. 
UCITA threatens fair use privileges that allow for the provision of fundamental 
library services like inter-library loan, archiving and preservation. 
UCITA threatens “first sale” privileges that permit donation, transfer or resale 
of a product. 
Id. 
 176. Who We Are, supra note 170. 
 177. Why We Oppose UCITA, supra note 171. 
 178. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 179. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-101 (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 
59.1-501.1 (2013). 
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that UCITA “bomb shelter,” also known as anti-UCITA provisions, were 
passed “to shield . . . state’s citizens from UCITA laws enacted in other 
states.”180  What began as an attempt to update UCC law for the Internet 
age instead resulted in extreme internal dissension between legal 
academics on how ideal regulations for intangible transactions should 
look.  The controversy came to a head in early 2003 when the American 
Bar Association withdrew the UCITA resolution from consideration.181  
The stiff opposition of AFFECT coupled with the withdrawal of ABA 
support for UCC2B left legislative solutions to the Clickwrap 
conundrum mired in disunion.  The UCC remains murky at best on the 
question of commercial transactions involving intellectual property, 
which has led to an Internet free-for-all.  Courts lack consistency in 
dealing with increasingly restrictive standard form digital contracts and 
EULAs that erode consumer protection. 
In 2003, legal scholars again tackled the problems of Clickwrap and 
Browsewrap by identifying the main problem: lack of informed consent.  
The Joint Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices and the 
UCC Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar 
Association proposed a test to determine reliable assent.182  The test 
considers whether the: 
(1) [U]ser is provided with adequate notice of the existence of the 
proposed terms; 
(2) [U]ser has a meaningful opportunity to review the terms; 
 
 180. UCITA “Bomb-Shelter” Legislation, AFFECT, 1, http://affect.ucita.com/pdf/ 
UCITABombShelter.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). 
 181. The controversy and the ABA’s subsequent withdrawal of the UCITA resolution 
from consideration are explained as follows: 
The withdrawal of the UCITA resolution followed in the wake of increasing 
opposition to this controversial act within the ABA.  Prior to the opening of the 
ABA Midyear Meeting in Seattle this weekend, UCITA failed to garner support 
from six ABA sections, including the Business Law, Intellectual Property, 
Litigation, Torts and Insurance Practice and Science and Technology sections.  
In addition, two committees, the Section Officers’ Council’s Technology 
Committee and the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security 
failed to support passage of the resolution.  Seven of the nine members of the 
ABA Working Group appointed to review UCITA in 2001 advised the House of 
Delegates that recent amendments to UCITA still did not make UCITA 
appropriate for approval at this time. 
See Carol Ashworth, UCITA Fails to Receive American Bar Association Approval (Feb. 11, 
2003), http://www3.wcl.american.edu/cni/0302/33202.html. 
 182. Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in 
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 280–81 (2003). 
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(3) [U]ser is provided with adequate notice that taking a specified 
action manifests assent to the terms; and 
(4) [U]ser takes the action specified in the latter notice.183 
This four-part test is appealing in its simplicity.  However, efforts to 
enact these clear guidelines and similar endeavors to protect consumers 
from unfair contract terms have been stalled by the bad blood between 
critics on either side of the UCITA debate.184  Attempts to regulate online 
agreements are thus tinged by the history of UCITA dissension and 
failure—not to mention the effective and highly vocal activism by 
AFFECT, concerned academics, consumer groups and librarians.  
Proposed guidelines are haunted by the extreme backlash and internal 
debate that continues to brew on online forums and among contract 
scholars frustrated with failed legislative proposals.185 
VI. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT:  
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS 
A. Copyright and Contract Law: A History of Tensions in the Digital 
Realm 
In order to explain how copyright law is poised to become the 
instrument of regulation for online contracts, it is first necessary to 
explain the interactions between contract law and copyright law.  Many 
early Internet legal commentators who studied the implications of the 
online expansion of contract law and copyright argued strongly for the 
regulation of contractual freedom via copyright law.  For example, in 
1998, Harvard Law Professor William W. Fisher, III wrote, “the question 
of the proper scope of intellectual property rights on the Internet and the 
question of the proper magnitude of contractual freedom on the Internet 
should be understood as interdependent.”186  He singled out standard 
form contracts in the form of Clickwrap licenses as the primary 
imbalance of contractual freedom: 
Click-through licenses [Clickwrap] and copyright management systems 
typically place consumers in a “take it or leave it” position.  
 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for 
Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1071–73 (2005). 
 185. See Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 470–73 (2008). 
 186. William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1203, 1212 (1998). 
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Opportunities for customized arrangements are virtually nonexistent.  
Customers commonly do not read the “terms and conditions” they are 
agreeing to.  Finally and perhaps most importantly, the potential 
consumers of an intellectual product are often not in a position, before 
deciding whether to agree to a limitation on its use, to predict how 
valuable the product will be to them and how burdensome will be the 
limitation in question.  In short, Internet-related contracts commonly 
implicate a dangerous combination of two conditions: the impediments 
to customization typical of contracts of adhesion[] and informational 
asymmetries . . . .187 
In sum, Fisher argued that the extension of contractual terms beyond 
normal copyright protections of materials “should be disallowed” and 
licensed products should only be protected by contractual terms within 
the copyright statutory protections.188  
Other writers contended that some kind of hybrid Internet law, 
based on contract law and free from state regulation, would best serve 
the needs of new Internet merchants who interacted with a global 
marketplace.189  Legal scholars who examined contract law on the 
Internet in the 1990s drew parallels between widespread Shrinkwrap 
licensing practices and the growing use of Clickwrap.  For example, in 
1995, commentator Mark Lemley wrote about the use of standard form 
Shrinkwrap contracts to expand owners’ rights far beyond the statutory 
guarantees of copyright law.190  Standard clauses, among other common 
terms, commonly prohibit “uses of the product that would have been 
permitted by the application of the fair-use doctrine in copyright law” 
and “[r]equire[] that the user pay royalties for a period longer than 
would be permitted by copyright or patent law.”191 
Some commentators focused on the copyright implications of 
Internet contracts and found that the Internet had created a marketplace 
for copyrighted works that used contract law to frustrate the 
fundamental goals of copyright protection.192  Internet contracts often 
expanded copyright protection to parallel Shrinkwrap licensing terms 
 
 187. Id. at 1245. 
 188. Id. at 1246. 
 189. See Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 226 (1997). 
 190. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1242–48 (1995). 
 191. Fisher III, supra note 186, at 1241 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property 
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1242–48 (1995)). 
 192. Lemley, supra note 190, at 1280. 
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found in paper EULAs shipped with software, creating situations where 
access to information was lessened.193  As Niva Elkin-Koren described: 
Users are arguably always subject to restrictions when they use a 
copyrighted work.  But restrictions imposed by copyright law are limited 
and reflect the balance between the need to induce creation and the need 
to guarantee public access to information.  If copyright owners are free 
to use contractual arrangements to restrict use and are then able to use 
copyright to prevent any use that is not subject to these restrictions, 
owners are gaining absolute monopoly over their works.194 
Despite the warnings of writers like Elkin-Koren, courts attempted early 
on to create a sharp divide between copyright law and contract law in 
favor of individual contracts.  In the landmark Shrinkwrap decision from 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the court notably stated, “whether a particular 
license is generous or restrictive, a simple two-party contract is not 
‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright’ and therefore may be enforced.”195 Thus, ProCD, which paved 
the way for widespread acceptance of Shrinkwrap and later Clickwrap 
contracts, ruled in favor of interpreting contract law independently from 
and superior to any overlapping copyright law principles.196  This 
reasoning was echoed in later decisions, such as Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies, Inc., where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt the Shrinkwrap 
contract in question and that the contract could expand the protections 
to the seller beyond those afforded by copyright law.197  
B. The Role of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in Policing Internet 
Law  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)198 was enacted in 
1998 to implement international treaties and effectively extended the 
reach of copyright law and limited the liability of Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) for illegal or infringing uses of copyrighted material by 
ISP users.199  Section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA requires that every three 
 
 193. Id. at 1245–48 (discussing Shrinkwrap user license agreements). 
 194. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 109–10 (1997). 
 195. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 196. Id. at 1454–55. 
 197. Bowers v. Baystate Techs. Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 198. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 199. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
SUMMARY (December 1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
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years the Librarian of Congress issue determinations on whether any 
classes of copyrighted works are subject to exemptions from copyright 
restrictions.200  Not only have these determinations directly altered 
copyright law, but they have also affected Internet law generally by 
removing restrictions from intellectual property.  Section 1201 provides: 
(D) The Librarian shall publish any class of copyrighted works for which 
the Librarian has determined, pursuant to the rulemaking conducted 
under subparagraph (C), that noninfringing uses by persons who are 
users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be, adversely affected, 
and the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to 
such users with respect to such class of works for the ensuing 3-year 
period.201 
These Librarian determinations of noninfringing uses are a very unique 
form of Internet regulation because the determinations are made every 
three years and can be revised to reflect new advances in digital user 
experiences.  Thus, the DMCA has a built-in series of hearings and 
determinations that are revisited often to perfect existing regulation of 
areas touched by copyright law.  Per the Copyright Office “Legislative 
Requirements for Rulemaking Proceedings,” a series of rulemaking 
proceedings take place every three years.202  The Register of Copyright is 
to “provide notice of the rulemaking, seek comments from the public, 
consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and 
Information of the Department of Commerce, and recommend final 
regulations to the Librarian of Congress.”203 
The proceedings are thus marked by clear checks and balances 
through the involvement of both official recommendations from the 
Department of Commerce and more informal “comments” from the 
public.204  While it may seem puzzling to view EULAs through the lens 
of the quasi-legislative process determined by the Copyright Office, 
copyright law has already been closely tied to Internet law generally, and 
to EULAs more recently.  
As very early Internet commentators pointed out, in a legal sense 
everything on the Internet could be subject to copyright violations.  For 
example, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., the U.S. District 
 
 200. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
 201. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(D). 
 202. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,826 (July 27, 2010) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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Court for the Central District of California considered whether 
transferring users from event pages on Ticketmaster.com to other pages 
within the website violated copyright law, questioning the legality of 
mere navigation from one website to another.205  The court concluded, 
“hyperlinking does not itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act 
(whatever it may do for other claims) since no copying is involved, the 
customer is automatically transferred to the particular genuine web page 
of the original author . . . .  This is analogous to using a library’s card 
index . . . .”206  Even more pertinently, the court considered whether the 
“small print” on Ticketmaster.com’s Browsewrap contract was 
enforceable.207  Ticketmaster’s Terms of Service stated, “no deep 
[hyper]linking to the site” was permitted.208  The court went on in a later 
ruling to state: 
[T]he time, place, venue, price, etc. of public events are not protected by 
copyright even if great care and expense is expended in gathering the 
information . . . . Thus, unfair as it may seem to T[icketmaster], the 
basic facts that it gathers and publishes cannot be protected from 
copying.  To be sure, the manner of expression and format of presenting 
those facts is protectable, but T[ickets.]com has taken great care not to 
use the T[icketmaster] format and expression in publishing the facts it 
takes from T[icketmaster].209 
The court weighed the power of the Ticketmaster EULA against the 
reach of copyright regulation and determined that copyright regulation 
effectively trumped the Browsewrap contract because Ticketmaster had 
attempted to contract terms beyond copyright protections.210  The court 
also drew a distinction between the website Terms of Service and 
Shrinkwrap contracts, stating:  
[C]ases[] where the packing on the outside of the CD stated that 
opening the package constitutes adherence to the license agreement 
contained therein . . . [have] been held to be enforceable.  That is not the 
same as this case because the “shrink-wrap license agreement” is open 
and obvious and in fact hard to miss.  Many web sites make you click on 
“agree” to the terms and conditions before going on, but Ticketmaster 
does not.  Further the terms and conditions are set forth so that the 
 
 205. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. (Ticketmaster I), No. CV99-7654 HLH, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *4–6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
 206. Id. at *6. 
 207. Id. at *8. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. (Ticketmaster II), No. CV99-7654-HLH, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2000). 
 210. See id. at *11–14. 
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customer needs to scroll down the home page to find and read them . . . .  
It cannot be said that merely putting the terms and conditions in this 
fashion necessarily creates a contract with any one using the web site.211 
Given the initial understandings of online content, however odd the 
discussions may seem today, as part of a potential canon of 
copyrightable digital content, it perhaps is not unreasonable that the 
Librarian determinations of the DMCA have become such a powerful 
source of Internet regulation through copyright law.  The most recent 
2010 Librarian determinations212 on works exempt from copyright law 
touched upon wide ranging areas of Internet law.213  The new 2010 
determinations allow: the incorporation of motion picture DVDs into 
new works for comment or criticism,214 the circumvention of controls on 
 
 211. Ticketmaster I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8. 
 212. James H. Billington, Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201 
Rulemakings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (July 26, 2010), available at http:// 
www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/Librarian-of-Congress-1201-Statement.html. 
 213. The doctrine of copyright Fair Use is a highly developed area of intellectual 
property law which deals generally with the exceptions and factors required to prove 
statutory exceptions under the U.S. Code Title 17 Chapter 1 Section 107, Limitations on 
Exclusive Rights: Fair Use, which states in pertinent part that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include —  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use 
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  For a general discussion of the Fair Use doctrine, see Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990). 
 214. Billington, supra note 212.  Included in one of the six classes of works were: 
(1) Motion pictures on DVDs that are lawfully made and acquired and that are 
protected by the Content Scrambling System when circumvention is 
accomplished solely in order to accomplish the incorporation of short portions 
of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism or comment, 
and where the person engaging in circumvention believes and has reasonable 
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executable programs on wireless telephone handsets,215 the connection 
of wireless telephone handsets to telecommunications networks,216 the 
investigation or correction of security flaws in video games,217 the 
protection of computer programs by dongles,218 and literary works in e-
book format with access controls.219  In practical terms, the 
determinations mean that formerly copyrighted material may be copied 
for educational use, that cellphone companies must allow users the 
 
grounds for believing that circumvention is necessary to fulfill the purpose of 
the use in the following instances: 
(i) Educational uses by college and university professors and by college 
and university film and media studies students; 
(ii) Documentary filmmaking; 
(iii) Noncommercial videos. 
Id. 
 215. Id. (“(2) Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute 
software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of 
enabling interoperability of such applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, 
with computer programs on the telephone handset.”). 
 216. The press release explains: 
(3) Computer programs, in the form of firmware or software, that enable used 
wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telecommunications 
network, when circumvention is initiated by the owner of the copy of the 
computer program solely in order to connect to a wireless telecommunications 
network and access to the network is authorized by the operator of the 
network. 
Id. 
 217. For video games: 
(4) Video games accessible on personal computers and protected by 
technological protection measures that control access to lawfully obtained 
works, when circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose of good 
faith testing for, investigating, or correcting security flaws or vulnerabilities, if: 
(i) The information derived from the security testing is used primarily to 
promote the security of the owner or operator of a computer, computer 
system, or computer network; and 
(ii) The information derived from the security testing is used or 
maintained in a manner that does not facilitate copyright infringement or 
a violation of applicable law. 
Id. 
 218. Id. (“(5) Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to 
malfunction or damage and which are obsolete.  A dongle shall be considered obsolete if 
it is no longer manufactured or if a replacement or repair is no longer reasonably 
available in the commercial marketplace[.]”). 
 219. Id. (“(6) Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook 
editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized 
entities) contain access controls that prevent the enabling either of the book’s read-aloud 
function or of screen readers that render the text into a specialized format.”). 
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ability to “tether” their smartphones to act as wireless hotspots, and that 
companies may reverse engineer video games to search for security 
flaws, among other new uses.  Again, the changes to copyright 
regulations have far reaching implications for a variety of users since so 
many copyrighted works are used in a range of digital mediums. 
However, from a contract perspective, copyright regulations are 
usually far removed from classic discussions of contract legality.  
Copyright regulation of EULAs through the DMCA has only recently 
encroached on software licensing.  The landmark Librarian 
determination for EULAs in 2010 was spurred by controversy over 
Apple’s popular iPhone and iPod Touch devices.  The determinations 
made waves in the legal communications community by legalizing the 
“jailbreaking,” also known as the “rooting” of smartphones.220  By 
jailbreaking an iPhone, a user can remove the limitations placed by 
individual cellphone manufacturers.221  For example, by jailbreaking the 
Apple iPhone, a user obtains access to the complete Unix file system, 
which makes up the operating system of the smartphone.222  Users can 
then download any application (i.e., smartphone “app”) or program for 
the phone instead of being limited to downloading from the approved 
programs available through Apple’s “App Store.”223  Since Apple 
dominated the smartphone market during the Librarian fact finding, the 
Apple iPhone became the public face of the fight over the legality of 
jailbreaking smartphones.224 
Before the Librarian of Congress created a Fair Use copyright 
exception for jailbreaking smartphones in 2010, individual smartphone 
owners were issued a copy of the User Policy from the phone 
manufacturer, which included a EULA governing the Terms of Use.  The 
popular Apple devices were shipped with EULAs which stated, among 
other terms, that the software was “licensed, not sold to you by Apple 
 
 220. To read more about jailbreaking, see Jenna Wortham, Unofficial Software Incurs 
Apple’s Wrath, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2009, 8:47 AM), http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/ 
docs/nytimes/2009-05-12_nytimes_iPhone_jailbreaks.pdf.  See also Nicolas Seriot, iPhone 
Privacy, http://seriot.ch/resources/talks_papers/iPhonePrivacy.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 
2013). 
 221. See Wortham, supra note 220. 
 222. See The iOS Environment, iOS Developer Library, APPLE, https:// 
developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/iphone/conceptual/iphoneosprogrammin
gguide/iPhoneAppProgrammingGuide.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
 223. See Wortham, supra note 220. 
 224. See Jacqui Cheng, Apple officially surpasses 10 million iPhones sold in 2008, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 21, 2008, 5:29 PM), http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2008/10/apple-
officially-surpasses-10-million-iPhones-sold-in-2008.ars. 
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Inc. for use only under the terms of this License.”225  It was not until 
midway through 2009 that Apple began to issue statements to users 
stating that the illegality of jailbreaking Apple devices stemmed from 
copyright law, instead of referring users to the wording in its own 
EULA.226  The abrupt change in justification from Apple came as a direct 
result of lobbying by groups such as Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF), who petitioned the Librarian of Congress during its last three-
year fact-finding period to rule that jailbreaking smartphones should be 
legal under the Fair Use doctrine.227  Thus, in an unexpected move, the 
DMCA transformed the discussion over the legality of the Apple EULA 
regarding jailbreaking from a question of contract law to a question of 
copyright Fair Use governed by the DMCA.  The 2010 Librarian 
determination that the restrictions placed on smartphones by cellphone 
companies were not the proper subject of copyright protection made 
licensing the protection code via EULA impossible.228  Simply put, the 
code that prevented jailbreaks is no longer protected by copyright law, 
which means that no license can apply to the code.  This in turn moves 
the code outside the protection of contract law as well since it is not the 
proper subject of a licensing agreement. 
This Librarian determination was groundbreaking because it 
highlighted the overlap between copyright regulation and contract law.  
The Librarian of Congress has now considered links on Internet websites 
as well as the mobile mediums by which users access the Internet.  
Perhaps unexpectedly, the Librarian of Congress has emerged as an 
arbiter of the intersection of copyright law and contract law due to the 
large overlap of legal precedent in relation to the Internet.  
 
 225. Apple iPhone Software License Agreement, APPLE, available at http:// 
www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iphoneos31.pdf.  The agreement states: 
1. General. The software (including Boot ROM code and other embedded 
software), documentation, interfaces, contents, fonts and any data that came 
with your iPhone (“Original iPhone Software”), as may be updated or replaced 
by feature enhancements, software updates, or system restore software 
provided by Apple (“iPhone Software Updates”), whether in read only memory, 
on any other media or in any other form (the Original iPhone Software and 
iPhone Software Updates are collectively referred to as the “iPhone software”)  
are licensed, not sold, to you by Apple Inc. (“Apple”) for use only under the 
terms of this License.  Apple and its licensors retain ownership of the iPhone 
software itself and reserve all rights not expressly granted to you. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 226. Mike Schramm, Apple Says Jailbreaking is Illegal, TUAW (Feb. 13, 2009, 1:45 
PM), http://www.tuaw.com/2009/02/13/apple-says-jailbreaking-is-illegal/. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Billington, supra note 212. 
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VII. WHY THE DMCA IS THE BEST HOPE FOR REMEDYING 
 DIGITAL LACK OF NOTICE 
In light of the 2010 Librarian of Congress determinations on 
jailbreaking smartphones, it is clear that the DMCA has the potential to 
use copyright law in areas that were traditionally left to private contracts 
between parties.  From a contract perspective, the 2010 determinations 
are stunning because suddenly, the tersely written language from 
smartphone EULAs simply did not matter anymore—the Librarian 
determinations had re-centered the legal battle to a determination of 
copyright law.   
The discussion over the legality of the Shrinkwrap smartphone EULAs, 
which mirrored the legal discussion from Clickwrap EULAs, was thus 
halted entirely by the requisite triennial Copyright Librarian 
determinations under the DMCA. 
EULAs are prevalent in Browsewrap and Clickwrap contracts 
online, and the DMCA represents a unique opportunity to balance 
federal regulation with the use of technology.  The DMCA, through the 
jailbreaking decision, has begun to look at overly restrictive EULAs 
related to software through the lens of the Fair Use copyright exception.  
Just as the Apple devices ran on proprietary software which shipped 
with a classic Shrinkwrap contract with a EULA in the Terms of Service, 
so too do many, if not a majority of, software programs, which are 
downloaded via Clickwrap agreements with very restrictive licensing 
terms.  As detailed above, there is complete agreement among circuit 
courts that a Clickwrap agreement is both legally valid and the 
equivalent of classic software licensing in Shrinkwrap contracts.  To the 
Librarian of Congress, it is possible that the close connection between 
Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap EULAs could justify an investigation into 
online contracting practices, since legally, there is no difference between 
the two. 
There are also indications that courts may be comfortable with 
allowing the DMCA to consider questions of digital EULA enforceability.  
In the 2004 case Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri considered the 
reverse engineering of video games on CD-ROMS, which contain the 
classic Shrinkwrap licenses, for the purposes of creating a rival open 
source alternative online gaming system to Battle.net, which then 
employed a hybrid Clickwrap-Browsewrap license.229  In negotiating the 
 
 229. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. 
Mo. 2004). 
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terms of all the competing EULAs, the court considered in great depth 
the Fair Use provisions of the Copyright Act under the DMCA as 
possible defenses for plaintiffs.230  The court finally decided the case on 
DMCA grounds by weighing the Fair Use defense of “interoperability” 
against the DMCA penalties for anti-circumvention technology and 
eventually held in favor of the licensing party.231  Thus, Internet Gateway 
is a clear example of a court’s use of the DMCA in conjunction with 
digital EULAs to balance copyright protections against Fair Use.  It 
altered the legal discussion of digital contracts from the EULA-
controlled, purely contractual defenses currently dominating 
Browsewrap agreements, to a more nuanced view of contract law 
aligning with DMCA considerations.  The DMCA could use its broad 
authority over copyrighted digital material, i.e., all material subject to 
licenses, to redesign the methods of digital contracting without 
overstepping into areas of traditional contract law, like determinations 
on valid offer and acceptance or unconscionability claims.  Instead, the 
DMCA would offer a fresh venue to rehear the arguments for and against 
standard regulation of digital contracts.  As detailed above, solutions to 
the Clickwrap conundrum and concerns about overreach by digital 
EULAs have generally stalled.  The cases reveal a landscape of erosion of 
consumer rights, confusion over notice requirements, and outright 
dissension among circuits on fundamental questions of online contract 
formation.  Similarly, legislative attempts to overhaul existing contract 
regulation for Internet transactions have fallen prey to internal 
controversy over UCITA.  
It is imperative that federal regulation be considered as a possible 
route forward in solving the Clickwrap conundrum and stopping the 
spread of overly powerful Browsewrap agreements.  Quite simply, the 
common law has failed to stop the abuses of Clickwrap and Browsewrap.  
In most circumstances, the UCC has proven to be well equipped to 
strike a balance between corporate concerns and protecting users from 
contracting abuses.  Unfortunately, the proposed UCC2B/UCITA 
provision was a failure.  Contract scholars continue to be deeply divided 
by UCC2B/UCITA, and with the withdrawal of support from the 
American Bar Association, further progress on state codification of 
UCC2B/UCITA in the future seems unlikely at best.  Similarly, national 
efforts to reopen discussion on enacting guidelines for creating 
enforceable contracts such as the proposed standards from the Joint 
 
 230. Id. at 1180–83. 
 231. Id. at 1135. 
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Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices232 have been stalled 
by the acrimony from the UCITA proposal.  Fortunately, the work done 
by these groups does not need to languish any longer.  The next 
Librarian determinations in 2013 are a timely opportunity for contract 
scholars to revisit the entrenched problems of EULAs with a fresh 
perspective in the forum of the Librarian hearings.  The main source of 
EULA litigation, mandatory arbitration clauses, could be negotiated and 
standards could be established to prevent unequal bargaining by 
removing form contracts with arbitration requirements as a proper 
subject of intellectual property protections. 
Similarly, the individual cases discussed here also foretell of the 
shortcomings of the judiciary in correcting digital EULA abuses.  The 
rise of Browsewrap has accelerated the inability of courts to reign in 
digital EULAs by muddling the point at which courts can convincingly 
invalidate contracts due to lack of assent.  The court in Ticketmaster 
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. stated, “[i]t cannot be said that merely putting 
the terms and conditions in this fashion [listed on the website] 
necessarily creates a contract with any one using the web site[,]”233 but 
the effectiveness of Clickwrap cases since ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg has 
created a legal climate where Clickwrap agreements are routinely 
enforced.234  Browsewrap is building on the successes of Clickwrap to 
push the boundaries of enforceable contracts even further.  Now, it is all 
too likely that any user clicking through a website can become bound to 
an overly restrictive EULA without even meaning to contract, and can be 
left without a meaningful chance to decline acceptance.  In the robot 
cases, users can send queries to a variety of websites looking for publicly 
available information and inadvertently become bound to a EULA from a 
website the users never even viewed. 
 
 232. Kunz et al., supra note 182, at 281.  The proposed test suggests that a user would 
validly and reliably assent to a Browsewrap agreement if the following four elements are 
met: 
(1) The user is provided with adequate notice of the existence of the proposed 
terms. 
(2) The user has a meaningful opportunity to review the terms. 
(3) The user is provided with adequate notice that taking a specified action 
manifests assent to the terms. 
(4) The user takes the action specified in the latter notice. 
Id. 
 233. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. (Ticketmaster I), No. CV99-7654 HLH, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
 234. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Instead of watching the common law continue to erode contract 
protections in adhesionary contracts through digital EULAs, the DMCA 
could easily adopt a simple four-part test, such as the standard proposed 
during the Librarian hearing process by the Joint Working Group on 
Electronic Contracting Practices.235  The DMCA also has the built-in 
protection of the agency-required three-year review of the copyright 
doctrine to self-correct any imbalances created by changes to contracting 
requirements.  Any change made by the DMCA would not become a far-
ranging tyranny of copyright law over contract law because new 
regulatory requirements would only extend to digital copyrighted 
material, such as licenses.  Thus, the basic tenants of digital contracts 
could remain intact, but the DMCA could regulate the licensing of 
intellectual property since such material falls under the purview of the 
DMCA.  While the ultimate scope of any DMCA intervention into 
EULAs generally is unclear, the Librarian determinations would at least 
provide a new start to the lofty goals of remedying online contract 
unfairness.  The impetus for UCC2B and the concerns in dozens of 
judicial opinions paint a clear picture of an Internet where standard form 
contractual terms have begun to overwhelm consumers who have little-
to-no individual bargaining power.  The DMCA can rebalance copyright 
law and contract law by insisting on a limit to adhesionary EULAs, thus 
extending copyright protection beyond the carefully crafted balances of 
intellectual property. 
The possibility that the DMCA’s intervention in the field of EULA 
regulation could result in a complete failure is hardly remote given the 
entrenched acrimony over UCITA.  However, the DMCA is the best hope 
for individual consumers to regain some semblance of traditional 
contract bargaining power.  Individual consumers, digital companies, 
and legal commentators all have a role to play in shaping the playing 
field of digital contracts.  The DMCA is a venue where the political 
process of reforming EULAs and salvaging informed consent could 
finally take place. 
CONCLUSION 
As detailed above, the presumed legality of Clickwrap agreements 
has hardly quieted the outrage felt by many users and legal 
commentators who find such electronic form contracts disquieting, to 
say the least.  Browsewrap agreements have gone even further than 
 
 235. Kunz et al., supra note 182, at 281. 
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Clickwrap and have exacerbated the contract concerns related to the 
assent requirement in traditional negotiated agreements.   
One opportunity for change is available in the fact-finding that the 
Librarian of Congress conducts every three years.  This Article posits 
that the recent 2010 expansion of the DMCA regulation into the arena of 
legalizing the jailbreaking of smartphones should also be viewed as an 
unexpected intervention into an area which, until the DMCA 
involvement, had been under the complete control of contract law 
through EULAs.  It is this involvement that has become the best chance 
to reclaim the traditional contract protections of notice and 
conscionability.  If copyright law, under the guise of license regulation, 
can invalidate the current lopsided “bargaining” of EULAs in favor of a 
more transparent process to assess contractual assent, then users and 
legal commentators should attempt to use the new shield of the DMCA 
copyright regulation to defend against the further encroachment of 
Clickwrap and Browsewrap.  
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